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This paper surveys fiscal policy in developing countries 
from the point of view of long-run growth. The first 
section reviews existing methodologies to estimate 
the effects of fiscal policy shocks and of systematic 
fiscal policy, with time series or with cross-sectional 
methods, and their applicability to developing countries. 
The second section surveys optimal fiscal policy in 
developing countries, by considering the role of the 
intertemporal government budget, and sustainability 
and solvency. It also reviews the fuzzy debate on 
“fiscal space” and “macroeconomic space” — and the 
usefulness (or lack thereof) of these terms for policy 
analysis. The third section asks what theory tells us 
about the optimal cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in 
developing countries. It shows that it very much depends 
on the assumptions about the interactions between 
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credit market imperfections at the individual, firms, or 
government level, and on the supply of external funds 
to the country. Different sets of assumptions lead to 
different implications about optimal cyclical behavior. 
The available evidence on the cyclical behavior of fiscal 
policy, and possible reasons for the observed prevalence 
of a procyclical behavior in developing countries, is also 
reviewed. If one agrees that fiscal policy is indeed less 
countercyclical than we think is optimal, the issue is 
how to correct the problem. One obvious question is 
why government do not self-insure, i.e. why they do not 
accumulate assets in upturns and decumulate them in 
downturns. This leads to the analysis of fiscal rules and 
stabilization funds, in the fourth section.  The last section 
concludes with what the author considers important 
research and policy questions in each part.Fiscal policy in developing countries: a framework
and some questions
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A recurrent theme in the policy debate about developing countries is that in the past
there has been an excessive focus on the objective of short-run stabilization as opposed to
the objective of long-run growth. Although it is not obvious that a trade-oﬀ between the
two objectives should exist, it is nonetheless useful to start by taking it as given because
it is so central to the current debate.
Assessing this statement requires a knowledge of the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of ﬁscal
policy. In the ﬁrst part of this paper, I therefore review existing methodologies to estimate
the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy shocks and of systematic ﬁscal policy, with time series or with
cross-sectional methods; I also review their applicability to developing countries, and what
we can plausibly hope to learn from them.
Based on this analysis, I then consider the issue of optimal ﬁscal policy in developing
countries. I start by considering the role of the ﬁrst obvious constraint, the intertemporal
government budget. This introduces the notions of sustainability and solvency. But these
well deﬁned notions have been obfuscated, in recent years, by the more fuzzy debate on
"ﬁscal space" and "macroeconomic space"; I then review the usefulness (or lack thereof)
of these terms for policy analysis.
The debate on short-run vs. long-run aspects of ﬁscal policy is often also cast in terms
of the procyclical (destabilizing) behavior of ﬁscal policy in developing countries. In the
third part, I ﬁrst ask what theory tells us about the optimal cyclical behavior of ﬁscal
policy in developing countries. I show that it very much depends on the assumptions
about the interactions between credit market imperfections at the individual, ﬁrm, or
government level, and on the supply of external funds to the country. Diﬀerent sets of
assumptions lead to diﬀerent implications about the optimal cyclical behavior of ﬁscal
policy. I then proceed to consider the available evidence on the cyclical behavior of
ﬁscal policy, and possible reasons for the observed prevalence of procyclical (destabilizing)
behavior in developing countries.
If one agrees that ﬁscal policy is indeed more procyclical (less countercyclical) than we
think is optimal, the question is how to correct the problem. One obvious question is why
governments do not self-insure, i.e. why they do not accumulate assets in upturns and
decumulate them in downturns. This leads to the analysis of ﬁscal rules and stabilization
funds, in the fourth part.
The last part concludes with what I consider important research and policy questions
in each part.
Although this is a survey, in a topic as vast as ﬁscal policy it necessarily must leave
out several important topics. I deal only indirectly with the issue of the optimal size of
government, and not at all with Ricardian equivalence, partly because there is not much
new in these areas in recent years, and partly because in my opinion these topics have been
over-researched in the past relative to other important topics. I also leave out entirely
1issues of ﬁscal federalism and of taxation, both because they would require a diﬀerent
survey each and because I do not have speciﬁc expertise in these ﬁelds.
2 Estimating the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
For both a positive and a normative assessment of the trade-oﬀ b e t w e e nt h es h o r t - r u na n d
the long-run objectives of ﬁscal policy, one ﬁrst needs to be able to estimate the eﬀects of
ﬁscal policy on the macroeconomy.
Roughly speaking, there are two types of questions we are interested in:
1) What are the stabilization or cyclical properties of ﬁscal policy?
2) What are the long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy?
In principle, both issues can be studied through two approaches:
1) The ﬁrst approach relies on time-series methodologies to study the eﬀects of a
shock (i.e., an unexpected change) in a given type of government spending on a given
variable.
2) The second approach relies on time-series, cross-sectional or panel regressions to
study the long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy or of alternative systematic ﬁscal policies. For
instance, what are the eﬀects of a given automatic stabilizer on the variability of out-
put? Or, what are the long-run eﬀects of a marginal change in a given type of public
infrastructure stock on the average growth rate?
In order to assess the stabilization properties of ﬁscal policy, both approaches are
relevant. If there is a negative shock to GDP, the policymaker would like to know how
the economy would respond, whether the policymaker should make a discretionary change
in, say, government consumption. But the policymaker would also like to know how much
stabilization can be expected ex ante from a given type of automatic stabilizer.
Both approaches are in principle relevant also to assess the long-run growth aspects
of ﬁscal policy. The second approach is probably the more natural one in this case:
should the stock of paved roads increase exogenously, how much would average long-run
growth increase? The ﬁrst approach can still be used, by tracing the eﬀects of a shock to
investment in paved roads into the distant future.
2.1 A methodological premise
The tools of empirical ﬁscal policy analysis have been mostly developed for and applied
to data for industrialized countries. Developing countries are diﬀerent from industrialized
countries in many respects, one important of which, for our purposes, is the structure
of the government budget. Typically, government budgets in industrialized countries
are bigger (as shares of GDP); and on the spending side they are more skewed towards
transfers; on the revenue side, towards personal and social security taxes. In developing
countries transfers are typically small, and the biggest share of government spending is
2represented by consumption of goods and services, and within this, by government wages;1
on the revenue side, indirect taxes often are the biggest component.
This is certainly true, but there is no reason to believe that the methodologies applied
to OECD countries should not apply to other countries: in essence, these methodologies
all deal, in diﬀerent ways, with the problem of reverse causality in estimating the eﬀects
of ﬁscal policy; though certainly not uncontroversial, they are currently the frontier of our
empirical exploration. Conceptually, there is no reason why radically diﬀerent methodolo-
gies (which have not been put forward anyway), or even ignoring the problem of reverse
causation altogether, should be better suited for developing countries.
The real issue, however, is data availability. Developing countries have drastically
worse ﬁscal data than industrialized countries, and this, as we will see, could be the
binding constraint.
3 Estimating the stabilization eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy in the short- to medium-run via time series
methodologies
In this section I will review time series methodologies to study the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
shocks in the short- to medium-run, relevant for stabilization policies. Compared with
cross-country regressions, these methodologies are much less common for developing coun-
tries; and although their use is spreading in recent years, their implications are not always
well understood. Because of the focus on the short- to medium-run, it is useful to think
of government spending here as current purchases of goods and services, or government
consumption.2
3.1 Theory
Virtually all reasonable economists agree that an increase in the interest rate controlled
by the monetary authorities will lead to some fall in the output gap and a slowdown in
inﬂation (although undoubtedly the magnitude and timing of these eﬀe c t si ss u b j e c tt o
some debate). Things are diﬀerent for ﬁscal policy: neoclassical and neokeynesian theories
1Governmemt consumption can be divided into the purchase of goods (and some services) on the
market (such as a car for the police or a computer for a school) and of non-market services (such as those
of public sector teachers and of policemen); this latter component is government wages.
2Theoretically, the government wage component of government consumption has very diﬀerent eﬀects
from the purchase of market goods component (see e.g. Finn (1998)). Empirically too these two com-
ponents have diﬀerent eﬀects (see Perotti 1997a)). For lack of space, I do not pursue these diﬀerences
here.
3have opposite implications for the eﬀects of a shock to government spending on goods and
services on such key variables as private consumption, and the real wage.
Assume ﬁrst that taxation is lump-sum, to eliminate the intertemporal and intratem-
poral substitution eﬀects of taxation. Essentially, in neoclassical models (such as Baxter
and King (1993)), a shock to government consumption generates a negative wealth ef-
fect on the inﬁnitely lived representative household (higher government spending means
higher taxation in present discounted value terms); as the household feels poorer, its labor
supply increases and its consumption declines (leisure and consumption are both normal
goods); as labor supply increases along a given labor demand, the real wage falls.
The story is very diﬀerent in neokeynesian models, where government spending causes
an outshift in the demand for goods for instance because of the presence of nominal
rigidities, or because of countercyclical markups (as in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uríbe
(2006)) or else because of increasing returns to scale (as in Devereux, Head and Lapham
(1996)). As the derived demand for labor also shifts out, the real wage can increase; and
as a consequence, private consumption too can increase, for instance because there are
liquidity constrained individuals who are forced to consume all their labor income each
period, as in Galí,López-Salido, and Vallés (2007), or via simple substitution from leisure
into consumption, as in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uríbe (2006) and Devereux, Head and
Lapham (1996).
Things are even more complicated for private investment: even within each strand of
theory, the eﬀects of government spending on private investment is depends on features
such as the persistence of the government spending shock in the neoclassical model, and
the relative strength of the accelerator eﬀect vs. the crowding out eﬀect in neokeynesian
models.
As we will see in the following sections, diﬀerent theories of the optimal behavior of
ﬁscal policy over the cycle- and by implication diﬀerent evaluations of the operation of
ﬁscal policy during ﬁnancial crises - are based on diﬀerent views about the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy on consumption, investment and the real wage.
Hence, estimating the response of these variables to a government spending shock
is therefore important both because it is of fundamental importance in assessing the
countercyclical and stabilization properties of ﬁscal policy, and because it is important
in discriminating between two fundamentally diﬀerent models of the economy, which is
in turn important in assessing the room for stabilizing policy. And yet, we will see that
there is no agreement at all on such a simple but basic question as the response of private
consumption to a shock to government consumption in the US: probably one half of the
profession would argue that the data show a positive response, the other half would argue
for a negative response. Similarly, alternative approaches to the estimation of the eﬀects
of ﬁscal shocks typically lead to diﬀerent estimates of the crowding out (or crowding in)
eﬀect of government spending on investment and on the current accounts in the US.
I now review these alternative empirical approaches, and derive implications for the
4study of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in developing countries.
3.2 Identifying ﬁscal shocks
Identifying shocks to government spending and taxation is a diﬃcult and controversial
exercise, which is nowhere near a consensus even in a much studied case like that of the
US. I will ﬁrst discuss a Structural Vector Autoregression Approach (SVAR) based on
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), which will also introduce a discussion of the many possible
problems in identifying ﬁscal policy shocks. Later I will discuss alternative approaches.
The natural context for time series methods is that of a Vector Autoregression. Start
from the reduced form speciﬁcation:
Xt = A(L)Xt−1 + Ut (1)
in which each variable in the vector Xt is regressed on, say, 4 lags of all variables in the
same vector. For simplicity, think of the vector Xt as including the log of output yt,
the log of government spending gt, a n dt h el o go ft a x e stt, all in real, per capita terms.
The reduced form residuals of the gt and tt equations, u
g
t and ut
t, can be thought of as
linear combinations of three components. First, the automatic response of government
spending and taxes to innovations in output, i.e. the response to the reduced form output
residual u
y
t; for instance, the automatic increase in tax revenues when output increases.
Second, the systematic discretionary response of peacemakers to innovations in the other
endogenous variables; for instance, reductions in tax rates implemented systematically in
response to recessions. Third, random discretionary shocks to ﬁscal policies; these are the
“structural” ﬁscal shocks, which unlike the reduced form residuals are uncorrelated with
all other structural shocks. This is the only component that is not correlated with output
shocks, hence this is the component we would like to isolate, so that we can then trace
























“structural” ﬁscal shocks, with cov(e
g
t,e t
t)=0 . Clearly, e
g
t and et
t are correlated with the
reduced form residuals, hence they cannot be obtained by an OLS estimation of (2) and
(3), nor are there any instruments available.
The key to identiﬁcation is the observation that it typically takes longer than a quar-
ter for discretionary ﬁscal policy to respond to, say, an output shock, hence if one uses
quarterly data the second component, the systematic discretionary response, is absent.
As a consequence, the coeﬃcients αty and αgy in (2) and (3) capture only the automatic
response of ﬁscal variables to economic activity. For OECD countries, one can use avail-
5able external information on the elasticity of taxes and spending to GDP, inﬂation and
interest rates to compute the appropriate values of these elasticities;3 with these, one can



























t can be obtained by orthogonalization, i.e. by assuming βgt =0or βtg =0 ;s i n c e




t is typically very low, the actual ordering does not
matter; as a benchmark, I will use the ﬁrst orthogonalization.
The two structural shocks thus estimated are orthogonal to the other structural shocks
of the economy, hence they can be used as instruments in the remaining equations: thus,















Once the structural shocks are identiﬁed, one can estimate the impulse response to,
say, a government spending shock by feeding the latter into the estimated dynamic system.
3.3 Applications
Thus, there are two key elements in this approach: the availability of external estimates
of the automatic responses of ﬁscal policy variables to other endogenous variables, like
output, inﬂation and the interest rate (and, in developing countries, probably to other
variables like commodity prices); and the availability of quarterly data, to ensure that
the second component (the systematic discretionary component) is absent from the esti-
mated reduced form residuals. Note also that the ﬁscal policy data ideally should cover
the general government, and perhaps even the non-ﬁnancial public sector, especially in
developing countries where the employment and investment policies of public enterprises
are often close substitutes of the same policies by the general government. All these el-
ements are typically absent in developing countries, and this is a fundamental obstacle
to applying this method soundly to these countries. In addition, in these countries of-
ten quarterly data are in reality interpolated from annual data, making them virtually
unusable for this purpose.
These features are often not well understood in attempts to apply this methodology
to developing countries. In their application to Argentina, Rezk et al. (2006) derive the
government spending and tax shocks from a Choleski decomposition in which government
spending is ordered ﬁrst and taxation second. Formally, this methodology is equivalent
3Importantly, these values of the elasticities of government revenues and transfers are not estimated,
but computed from institutional information on statutory tax brackets, the distribution of taxpayers by
income classes, the statutory unemployment beneﬁt, etc.
6to assuming that both government spending and, more seriously, tax revenues do not
respond contemporaneously to any innovation in the economy - clearly a counterfactual
assumption.
Many studies resort to the use of Granger causality as a substitute for a careful
identiﬁcation. It is instead well known that Granger causality is a purely statistical
deﬁnition, that has little to do with our notion of causality in an economically meaningful
sense.
Virtually all of these studies use annual data; this is a problem because with annual
data one cannot exclude that the estimated innovation in government spending is conta-
minated by a discretionary response of policymakers to other innovations in the economy
(the second component above). For instance, a ﬁnding that a shock to a government
spending component has a negative eﬀect on output might simply capture the fact that,
when there is a negative output shock, the policymaker increases government spending as
a countercyclical measure.
Others (like M’ Amanja, Lloyd and Morrissey (2007) on Kenya) do not make any
attempt to identify the structural shocks, thus identifying shocks that are likely to be
contaminated by all other shocks to the economy. The consequences of all this can be
best explained by looking at the results of M’ Amanja and Morrissey (2006), still on
Kenya. Both in a static, cointegrating regression with GDP growth as the dependent
variable and in a dynamic regression of GDP growth on lagged ﬁscal policy variables,
they ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on the tax revenue variable: far from being surprising, this
is indeed most likely the result of reverse causation: when there is a positive shock to GDP,
tax revenues increase (the ﬁrst component above); no Granger causality analysis can over-
come this problem. Similarly, they ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient on productive government
consumption (education, health and economic services); again, this could easily explained
by reverse causation: when there is a negative GDP shock, the policymaker increases
government spending as a countercyclical measure (the second component above).
The importance of an accurate treatment of the joint endogeneity issues can be gath-
ered by recent work on the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy on the current account and the real
exchange rate. Using the SVAR approach described above, Monacelli and Perotti (2007)
ﬁnd that, on a sample of four OECD countries (the US, the UK, Canada and Australia),
a shock to government spending or the deﬁcit tends to lower the current account surplus
(consistent with many existing models) and to depreciate the real exchange rate (which
can be rationalized only if international capital markets are not perfect). Using a VAR
with a diﬀerent identiﬁcation scheme, however, Kim and Roubini (2005) ﬁnd the opposite
eﬀect of a shock to the budget deﬁcit on the current account surplus ("the twin deﬁcits"
hypothesis). The reason for this diﬀerence can be traced back entirely to diﬀerences in
the identiﬁcation scheme and the deﬁnition of the variables. Kim and Roubini (2005)
deﬁne the budget deﬁcit and the current account surplus as shares of GDP; and they use
a Choleski decomposition in which GDP comes ﬁrst and the budget deﬁcit second: this
7imposes by construction the restriction that a shock to government consumption has zero
eﬀect on GDP contemporaneously, although government consumption is part of GDP.
However, a shock to GDP is allowed to aﬀect the deﬁcit. Intuitively, suppose there is
a negative realization of the GDP shock: the deﬁcit/GDP ratio increases both because
the denominator falls, and because at the numerator tax revenues fall. This creates a
spurious negative correlation between the deﬁcit and the GDP innovations; but, as GDP
falls, the trade balance improves, hence this also creates a spurious positive correlation
between the deﬁcit and the trade balance innovations.
3.4 Controversies
One should also be aware that the SVAR methodology illustrated so far is itself by no
means uncontroversial. One important problem is that the ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed by
the econometrician might not be entirely unanticipated by the private sector: exactly
because, with quarterly data, it takes time to implement discretionary changes in ﬁscal
policy, by the same token one can argue that these changes are known well before being
implemented. This would imply that the observed innovations in ﬁscal policy in reality
include an anticipated component, and the resulting impulse responses would be biased.
To see what this could imply, note that VARs on the US data typically ﬁnd a positive
eﬀects of a shock to government spending on GDP and private consumption; this neo-
keynesian result is at odds with the standard neoclassical model, where typically an
increase in government spending causes a decline in private consumption because of the
negative wealth eﬀect it causes. However, it is easy to show that in the neoclassical
model an increase in private consumption is the result one should expect in response to
an anticipated government spending shock.
An alternative approach to the estimation of the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, due initially to
Ramey and Shapiro (1997) and developed by Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1999),
consists in tracing the dynamic eﬀects of a shock to dummy variables capturing the onset
of a few episodes of military buildups, that can plausibly be thought of as exogenous to
GDP and unanticipated by the private sector (the Korean War, the Vietnam military
buildup, and the Carter - Reagan buildup). Under this approach, the response of private
consumption to a ﬁscal policy shock is typically found to be negative. However, Perotti
(2007a) argues that, when properly implemented, this approach delivers responses that
are qualitatively similar to those of the SVAR approach (but see Ramey (2007) for an
opposite view).
It is fair to say that very little of this debate has trickled down to time series studies
of ﬁscal policy in developing countries. Yet, as we have seen, without a sound grasp of
these problems of identiﬁcation it is not clear what to make of a ﬁnding that an increase
of government spending by x percent reduces private investment by z percent.
To all this, one should add that typically ﬁscal policy is much more volatile in develop-
8ing countries, with sometimes very large changes around, for instance, sudden stops; that
the available time series are much shorter; and that in periods of high inﬂation and large
changes in relative prices deﬂating government spending is problematic. When all these
problems are compounded, one should exercise an unusual amount of care in interpreting
t h et i m es e r i e ss t u d i e so fﬁscal policy in developing countries. And, unfortunately, it is
not clear how much progress can be made in the near future.
4 Estimating the long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy and
the returns to public infrastructure
I now consider estimates of the long-run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. These eﬀects are relevant
in particular in the case of public infrastructure4, and more generally of public investment
in an economic sense (as opposed to a national account sense, hence possibly including
items like investment in education etc.).
4.1 Production and cost function estimates, and growth
regressions
The natural approach to estimating the long-run eﬀects of government spending consists
in estimating production functions or cost functions, via time series, panel or cross-section
methods. In fact, the high rates of return to public infrastructure and education spend-
ing typically (but not always) estimated by this literature have been used extensively
to motivate the call for more "ﬁscal space" and more spending on infrastructure and
education.
In a seminal contribution on US annual data, Aschauer [1989] calculated that, holding
constant private inputs, private GDP would increase permanently by more than one to
one for every additional unit of non-defense public capital - in other words, that the annual
marginal product of public capital is in excess of 100 percent. Aschauer’s results were
based on a static production function estimated with yearly US data in levels. Subsequent
research estimating production functions using pooled US state data in levels (Munnell
[1990]), disaggregating public capital into its main components (Finn [1993]), or using
industry data (Fernald [1993]) also found similar eﬀects, particularly for roads and highway
capital. Time series estimates in levels might simply capture common trends; pooled state
data in levels might simply capture underlying persistent state characteristics - richer
states invest more in public capital. In fact, when the production function is estimated
with aggregate US data in diﬀerences, or with state data with ﬁxed eﬀects, zero or even
4In theory, public infrastructure can aﬀect growth and, ultimately, welfare via a large number of poten-
tial channels: see Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) and Romp and DeHaan (2007) for a recent review.
Estache (2004) provides a very useful survey of the main policy issues concerning public infrastructure.
9negative marginal products of public capital become typical (see Tatom [1991] and Hulten
and Schwab [1991] for estimates in diﬀerences; Evans and Karras [1994], Hotz-Eakin
[1994], Garcia-Milà, McGuire, and Porter [1996] for estimates with ﬁxed eﬀects).
A well known limitation of the production function approach is the joint endogeneity
of private inputs and outputs. Besides using instruments of dubious validity in estimating
production functions, a frequent response has been to use a cost function approach, which
takes as given private input prices instead of quantities (for the US, see for example Nadiri
and Mamouneas [1994] and Morrison and Schwartz [1996]). This is hardly a solution,
though: at the typical level of aggregation of these studies (US states or industries) private
input prices are also likely to be jointly determined with input and output quantities (see
Houghwout [2002]).
Applications of these approaches to individual developing countries are rare: Albala-
Bertrand and Mamaitzakis (2007) estimate a cost function using disaggregated data on
diﬀerent types of public capital in Chile; Albala-Bertrand and Mamaitzakis (2004) use the
same Chilean data to estimate a production function. But it is certainly fair to say that
they are not very common. More common for developing countries have been cross-section
or panel data estimates of production functions, regressing GDP on private capital and
public capital, often disaggregated by type: good examples are Canning and Bennathan
(2000) and Calderón and Servén (2003). These are based on a careful reconstruction of
diﬀerent types of public capital stocks in a number of countries at all levels of income.
Cross section or panel production function regressions are similar in nature to growth
regressions with public infrastructure on the right hand side5, pioneered by Easterly and
Rebelo (1993), who found large positive eﬀects of public infrastructure on growth, and by
Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996), who instead found weaker eﬀects.6
Thus, whether cost functions. or production functions, or standard growth regressions,
these all suﬀer from the same well-known problems of growth regressions, as reviewed for
instance in Temple (1999), Durlauf, Johnson and Temple (2004) and Easterly (2004):
among others, parameter heterogeneity, sensitivity to outliers, and model uncertainty.
But for our speciﬁc purposes the most important problem, which is also shared by sim-
ple time-series estimates of production and cost functions for individual countries, is the
endogeneity of public investment: in country-periods where growth is "unusually" high
given the values of the right hand side variables, it is plausible to think that the policy-
makers will have the resources to spend more on public infrastructure projects (a positive
correlation between the residual and the regressor); and in some country-periods with un-
usually low rates of growth, it is plausible to think that policymakers might spend more
on infrastructure in an attempt to raise growth (a negative correlation). This problem can
5The key diﬀerence is that the production function approach may impose some restrictions across teh
coeﬃcients of the factors of teh production function.
6Subsequent contributionsd are reveiwed by Romp and de Haan (2005) and Briceño-Garmenda, Es-
tache, and Shaﬁk (2004), who also conclude that this particular literature is inconclusive.
10be solved if one can ﬁnd plausible instruments: but such instruments are exceedingly rare
in the context of growth theory. For instance, typical instruments for the stock of public
infrastructure capital are demographic variables like population density and urbanization
(see e.g. Canning (1998) and Calderón and Servén (2004)): yet, it is diﬃcult to argue
that, over long periods of time, they are exogenous to growth.
Modelling explicitly the political-economy process driving public infrastructure invest-
ment is an alternative way to ﬁnding adequate instruments. The underlying assumption is
that the politico-economic determinants of public investment aﬀects growth only through
the latter, but not directly. Cadot, Röller and Stephan (2006) apply this approach to a
panel of French regions, and Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) to a panel of German cities;
they ﬁnd indeed evidence that regional public investment in transportation infrastructure
is driven by regional lobbying power and not by the objective to maximize the economic
returns to infrastructure; however because public investment is a small share of public
capital, they also ﬁnd that eliminating this source of bias does not alter much the OLS
estimate of the social returns to public transportation infrastructure. However, this is
hardly surprising because public investment is a minimal fraction of public capital. Note
also that this approach does not address an alternative potential source of bias, that of
regions experiencing higher growth spending more on infrastructure.7
4.2 Vector Autoregressions
As we have seen, in principle a Vector Autoregression approach can address these reverse
causality problems, and can be used to estimate the long-run eﬀects of shocks to govern-
ment spending, in particular public investment. Kamps [2004] lists 20 VAR studies of
the eﬀects of public investment in OECD countries. With few exceptions, however, these
studies use annual data, thereby making it diﬃcult to separate true exogenous shocks
to public investment from the endogenous response of public investment to other macro-
economic shocks. Quarterly data are used by Otto and Voss [1996], Voss [2002], Kamps
[2004], Mittnik and Neumann [2001], Perotti (2007b), and Creel, Monperrus-Véroni and
Saraceno (2007). Using this methodology, Perotti (2007b) ﬁnds that in four OECD coun-
tries for which the data are available (the US, the UK, Canada and Australia), there is
little evidence that a shock to public investment raises GDP in the long run.
Ap o t e n t i a lp r o b l e mw i t ht h i sa p p r o a c hw h e nu s e dt oe s t i m a t et h ee ﬀects of public
investment is that impulse responses at very long horizons are likely to have large standard
errors. A second possible problem is that decision lags for public investment projects are
likely to be longer than for government consumption; hence, the problem of predictability
7Note that country, state or region ﬁxed eﬀects in yearly panel regressions would not take care of the
problem. While they partial out persistent state speciﬁc determinants of public capital, they do nothing
against endogeneity arising from countries (states, regions) states spending systematically more (or less)
when GDP or growth are high.
11of the estimated SVAR shocks is likely to be more serious. For these reasons, attempts
at using VAR and other time series methodologies to estimate the eﬀects of public
investment and infrastructure should be interpreted with caution, particularly given the
data limitations that are common in developing countries.
In addition, a candid analysis of the few existing studies on developing countries
suggests that the standards used seem to be more lax than for the rest of the literature.
Some of these studies (like Perkins, Fedderke and Luiz (2005) on public investment in
South Africa) rely exclusively on cointegration analysis, which essentially reduces to a
static regression of growth on government investment and other variables; besides suﬀering
from other problems, in itself it cannot say anything on the direction of causality.
A widely cited study on the eﬀects of infrastructure investment in Brazil, Ferreira
and Araúio (2005), uses mostly cointegration analysis to infer a pattern of causality from
infrastructure investment to growth. In a one page section the authors present results from
the estimation of a VAR with a cointegration constraint imposed, and with a Choleski
ordering to estimate the structural shocks. The impulse responses show that, in response
to an initial shock to investment infrastructure by 1 percent of GDP, GDP itself increases
in the long run by 10 percent. This is a seemingly staggering number, which should by
itself warn against the soundness of the approach. Unfortunately no standard errors are
provided.8
5O p t i m a l ﬁscal policy under constraints
Knowing the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy is a precondition to study its optimality. This notion of
optimality is obviously a constrained one. The ﬁrst constraint is obvious: the intertempo-
ral government budget. But there are potentially more: roughly speaking, we can group
them under the headings of credit market imperfections and of political constraints. The
remainder of this paper can be seen as a discussion of the eﬀects of these constraints on
the optimal ﬁscal policy. Let us start from the one constraint that is certainly always
there: the government budget constraint.
5.1 Solvency and sustainability: deﬁnitions and tests
An important concern for international organizations is if the current ﬁscal stance is in
some sense "appropriate" from a long-term perspective. The concept of sustainability is
a useful tool for this assessment. It is important to distinguish between the notions of
solvency and sustainability.
8Indeed, the absence of standard errors is another common feature of several of these studies.
125.2 Sustainability: tests and measures of gap
Assuming for simplicity a constant interest rate9 one can write the ﬂow government budget
constraint as:










The government is solvent if the limit on the rhs is non positive: in this case, the
government is not allowed to run a Ponzi scheme, i.e. to roll over debt forever. In other
w o r d s ,t h eg o v e r n m e n ti ss o l v e n ti ft h ep r e s e n td i s c o u n t e dv a l u eo ft h eﬂow of all revenues
is enough to cover the value of outstanding debt plus the present discounted value of all
spending. Fiscal policy is sustainable when, given the historical data generating process
for spending and revenues, the solvency condition is satisﬁed.
The diﬀerence between the present discounted value of the surplus and the current
debt (or net debt, if there are positive government assets) is sometimes called the "govern-
ment net worth" If initially this diﬀerence is positive (i.e., if limJ→∞(1+r)−JBt+J < 0),
a given change in ﬁscal policy could change the government net worth without aﬀecting
sustainability. Note, however, that a rational government in general will not want to have
a negative limit: hence, the no-Ponzi scheme condition plus rationality by the government
will imply that, in expectations, the initial debt is equal to the present discounted value
of primary surpluses.
A large literature studies the construction of appropriate solvency tests. However,
I will argue that this literature is more appropriately (and more usefully) testing sus-
tainability. In essence, solvency tests are tests of the limit on the rhs being no greater
than 0 (the no Ponzi game condition). There are several variants of this test, reviewed
for instance in Chalk and Hemming (2000). A typical such test tests the existence of
cointegration between revenues and spending, which is a suﬃcient condition for solvency.
The statistical shortcomings of such tests are well known, including their low power
and their sensitivity to the existence or lack thereof of a unit root in debt and the surplus.
But there is a more fundamental issue if these are interpreted as tests of solvency.A n y
theoretical model implies that the IGBC is satisﬁed ex ante: if the no-Ponzi condition were
violated the private sector would not be optimizing (assuming the existence of inﬁnitely
lived agents, or, equivalently, that ﬁnitely lived agents are linked via intergenerational
altruism). As a consequence, the fact that solvency is not satisﬁed given the historical
data generating process simply implies that some adjustment will be needed in the future;
9Also for simplicity, I assume 0 inﬂation, hence no distiction between the real and nominal interest
rate.
13such adjustment is presumably taken into account by the private sector.
These tests are more useful if interpreted as tests of sustainability.C a l c u l a t i n gt h e
diﬀerence over a medium-term horizon (say 5 to 10 years) between the sum of initial
liabilities and the present discounted value (PDV) of spending on one hand, and the PDV
of revenues on the other, given the historical generating processes, is useful in that it can
provide an idea of the adjustment needed, in PDV terms, for the IGBC to be satisﬁed:
the “intertemporal budget constraint gap”.10
This is conceptually very similar to a frequently used measure of sustainability, the
Blanchard measure. From (6) written in terms of shares of GDP (and assuming for
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in steady state one has
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where s∗ is the long-run surplus that stabilizes debt at some predeﬁned level b∗ (which






it can be interpreted as providing the steady-state level of debt consistent with a certain
long-run value of the surplus.
Strictly speaking, if solvency is satisﬁed, it is not clear why one should worry about
sustainability. Presumably the real value of sustainability tests is that solvency is an
elusive concept, and can always invoke solvency by appealing to some change in spending
or taxation far into the future. But markets are not interested in the distant future, and
for them sustainability is an important element of information.
5.3 The role of uncertainty
However, as remarked by Mendoza and Oviedo (2004), the important shortcoming of this
measure is that it does not take into account the uncertainty surrounding future revenues
and spending. Suppose a government is extremely averse to reducing spending below
a certain level gmin; suppose also that in time of crisis revenues drop to a minimum of
10The same notion can be applied to changes. Calderon and Servén (2003) estimate that in Latin
American countries, especially those with high debts, cutting public investment had only a small positive
impact on government next worth. Instead, on a sample of four OECD countries, and using a SVAR
methodology, Perotti (2007b) ﬁnds that the positive impact on government net worth of a cut in public
investment is been large,
14tmin; then the “Natural Debt Limit” is the maximum level of debt that the government
c a ns e r v i c ee v e ni ft h e r ei sap e r m a n e n ts t a t eo fﬁscal crisis: in other words, a very risk
averse government would not want to borrow more than the NDL. It is given by the





If uncertainty on tax revenues is modeled as a a Markov process with tmin set at, say, two
standard deviations below the mean, clearly of two countries with the same gmin and the
same average tax rate, the one with the higher variance will also have the lower NDL; in
contrast, for the Blanchard measure there is no diﬀerence between the two. In addition,
in general the Blanchard measure will indicate as sustainable a debt level that is above
the NDL according to this method.
Consideration of uncertainty also modiﬁe sa l lt h et e s t sr e v i e w e ds of a r . A sB o h n
(1995) shows, in the presence of uncertainty (and if individuals are not risk neutral) the
correct discount factor to be used in evaluating the PDV of future surpluses is not the real
interest rate on public debt, but the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption at diﬀerent
horizons. This result in the presence of a covariance term between the marginal rate of
substitution in consumption and the surplus, which implies that, for the same sequence
of primary balances, the one which is countercyclical (i.e., exhibits a positive correlation
between the marginal utility of consumption and the primary balance, or a procyclical
ﬁscal policy) can borrow more and still maintain ﬁscal solvency - a counterintuitive result.
Bohn (1995) shows that ignoring uncertainty can lead to serious mistakes,. For instance,
in a model with i.i.d. output growth and a balanced growth, if the debt ratio is constant
and the rate of growth of GDP is higher than the real interest rate, the standard solvency
condition would be violated, and yet the correct solvency condition under uncertainty
would be satisﬁed.
Bohn (2005) shows that this reasoning leads to a new test of sustainability: in a re-
gression of the primary balance on debt, holding constant other factors, the coeﬃcient on
debt must be positive. Mendoza and Ostry (2007) ﬁnd that, in a sample of 34 developing
countries and 21 industrial countries, most countries satisfy display a positive coeﬃcient
on debt, and conclude that ﬁscal solvency is not a problem. However, they also ﬁnd that:
(i) developing countries have on average a higher coeﬃcient on debt - a result that does
no necessarily imply "more sustainable" ﬁscal policies, but may simply indicate limited
access to international ﬁnancial markets, which would be consistent with the procyclical
nature of ﬁscal policy. (ii) developing countries with higher debt level have an insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient on debt, indicating that indeed this group of countries might face problems of
sustainability.
155.4 Sustainability analysis in practice
Chalk and Hemming (2000) and IMF (2003a) provide a useful description of the typical
sustainability analysis carried out by the IMF. Its core is a ﬁve year projection of the evo-
lution of debt (party based on the national authorities’s programs), providing something
akin to the “intertemporal budget constraint gap”, i.e. an indication of the adjustment
needed in PDV terms. A by-product of this process is an evaluation of the debt level
at the end of the horizon: if it is higher than at the beginning, typically an alternative
adjustment scenario is called for to ensure stable debt. Clearly this is in the spirit of the
Blanchard measure, because it indicates that the projected ﬁscal stance does not generate
a stable debt.
Other, less common, stages in the analysis of sustainability include: (i) a sensitivity
analysis (or "stress test"), obtained by shocking a few variables driving the primary
balance by two standard deviations, thus providing an assessment of a worst case scenario;
and, less widespread;11 (ii) a stochastic simulation approach, where an explicit probability
function of the possible debt outcomes is computed; (iii) a scenario analysis, with less
extreme assumptions about the driving processes.
There is clearly a trade-oﬀ between the simplicity of a stress test and the need to take
into account a more realistic pattern of shocks. In a scenario analysis, a model is used to
draw constellations of the variables involved in a more detailed version of (6) from a set
of primitive shocks; in a stress test, extreme values of a few variables (some of which may
be endogenous) are drawn. A scenario analysis is obviously more reﬁned in principle, but
the simplicity of a stress test has much to recommend itself.
Related to this analysis is the use of "debt thresholds" in the IMF and World Bank
analyses: the results above by Mendoza and Ostry (2007) on the group of high debt
developing countries provide a justiﬁcation for this. In fact, after the ﬁnancial crises of
the nineties there has been a widespread interest in a system of early warnings, i.e. a
threshold level of debt above which default becomes likely. An obvious candidate is a logit
model of debt default, as a function of various macro determinants: Manasse, Roubini and
Schinn (2003) provide such analysis. A less sophisticated, but perhaps more practical,
alternative warning system is simply a growing debt level from the ﬁrst stage of the typical
sustainability analysis below: whenever debt is projected to increase, a warning is ﬂagged.
5.5 Fiscal and macroeconomic space
5.5.1 Fiscal space
The intertemporal government budget constraint and the notion of sustainability are
important, if obvious, starting points to think about optimal ﬁscal policy. In recent
11IMF (2003) shows that a simultaneous shock of two standard deviations to the main macor variables
is well within the bounds of what happened during the main ﬁnancial crises of the nineties.
16years, in the internal debate of international organizations diﬀerent notions have come to
the forefront, which to close scrutiny are very close to the concept of the intertemporal
government budget constraint, but have confused rather than helped the debate: the
notions of ﬁscal space and macroeconomic space.
In the aftermaths of the ﬁnancial crises of the late 1990s, with all their ﬁscal policy
consequences, a debate started on the perceived constraints on ﬁscal policy: many de-
veloping countries were perceived as sacriﬁcing their long run growth potentials in order
to show some sign of ﬁscal discipline. As we discuss later, the ﬁscal discipline that the
market and international organizations demanded, and that later many of these countries
themselves pursued willingly, could be ascribed to various (not all independent)reasons:
fears of unsustainability, credit constraints, precautionary savings, etc. But there was
a strong pressure on international organizations to help relax these constraints, and to
provide a framework for thinking about the issue. Hence the concept of "ﬁscal space".
In one of the rare deﬁnitions, ﬁscal space is deﬁned as “the availability of budgetary
room that allows a government to provide resources for a desired purpose without any
prejudice to the sustainability of a government’s ﬁnancial position.” (Heller (2005), p.3).
“Usually, the idea is that in creating ﬁscal space, additional resources can be made avail-
able for some form of meritorious government spending (or tax reduction).” (Heller (2005),
p. 3).
These two passages illustrate well the two key features of the notion of "ﬁscal space".
First, the notion is essentially a restatement of the intertemporal government budget
constraint, and perhaps of the notion of sustainability. We certainly know that in order
to increase some type of government spending now we need either to reduce other types of
spending now or in the future, or increase current or future revenues (including seigniorage
or foreign aid) - or inﬂate away existing nominal debt. Note also that, contrary to some
interpretations, the notion of ﬁscal space is perfectly consistent with the idea of increasing
debt today: in fact, it requires that higher deﬁcits today be compensated by higher
surpluses or lower deﬁcits in the future. All this assuming, of course, that one knows how
to measure the sustainability of public ﬁnances (on which more later).
The second feature of the notion of ﬁscal space also seems to be rather obvious: if
one type of spending has a higher social marginal value than another and the same cost,
resources should be moved from the second to the ﬁrst. In the end, it all boils down to
making an assessment of the economic eﬀects of diﬀerent types of ﬁscal policy, and of
their impact on social welfare. But this was the problem all along.
5.5.2 Growth and distributional objectives
“Social marginal value” can refer to several objectives, from distribution to growth. Often
the notion of ﬁscal space is further specialized to refer to the creation of resources for
growth-enhancing spending: “The incentive for creating ﬁscal space is strengthened where
17the resulting ﬁscal outlays would boost medium-term growth and perhaps even pay for
itself in terms of future ﬁscal revenue”; or [ﬁscal space ] “can be seen to refer to constraints
to public expenditure which have the potential to raise productivity and yield returns in
the future or which would serve to achieve social goals (such as the MDGs).” Note that,
in this reﬁnement of the notion, the distributional aspects of government spending do not
play any role.
The potential confusion between the growth and distributional aspects of ﬁscal policy,
both of which have right of citizenship a priori in the notion of ﬁscal space, can be seen
when one tries to operationalize this notion, as in a World Bank Report on ﬁscal policy
in Ecuador deﬁnes ﬁscal space: “Fiscal space is the sum of resources available to ﬁnance
the current-both non-wage and non-pension-primary expenditure required by individual
programs and investment projects associated with the PRS. This is an intermediate de-
ﬁnition of ﬁscal space between two extremes. A stricter deﬁnition would restrict it to
investment spending, but this would exclude goods and services required to implement
it, e.g. on basic infrastructure maintenance (roads). Alternatively, an extended deﬁnition
would include wage and beneﬁts, especially outlays associated to human capital formation
(like teachers’ salaries and pensions). However, this would associate pension increases to
pro-poor spending (which is not the case, even when restricted to the social sectors).”
(World Bank (2004a), p. 47). It is hard to understand what is the rationale behind
this deﬁnition. It seems to state that the “meritorious” spending for which one needs
to generate “ﬁscal space” is public investment plus maintenance spending, and possibly
all pro-poor spending that is associated with human capital formation. There is nothing
wrong with this (although here the aggregate and distributive aspects of ﬁscal policy ap-
pear to be mixed together); but, once again, what it really seems to say is that Ecuador
should spend more on infrastructure. In this instance, the forced use of the concept of
ﬁscal space and the complications it introduces are decidedly unhelpful.
5.5.3 Macroeconomic space
A further source of confusion is that between "ﬁscal" and "macroeconomic" space. “‘Macro-
economic space’ exists when a government can increase expenditure without impairing
macroeconomic stability. Since both solvency and stability must be safeguarded for long
term growth, a government can undertake additional public expenditure when there is
both ﬁscal and macroeconomic space”. Here too the expression is perhaps useful as a
communication tool; but the relation between ﬁscal policy and macroeconomic stability
(loosely deﬁned) has always been at the forefront of the debate on the eﬀects of ﬁscal
policy in developing countries; for instance, the issue has played perhaps the key role in
the debate on the 1997 crises, and the notion of macroeconomic space does not seem to
a d da n y t h i n gt oi t .
But when the two notions of space become mixed, then their use becomes needlessly
18confusing, as in the following passage: “What is ﬁscal space? It can be deﬁned as room in
a government´s budget that allows it to provide resources for a desired purpose without
jeopardizing the sustainability of its ﬁnancial position or the stability of the economy”
(italics added).
To sum up, the notions of ﬁscal space and macroeconomic space often suﬀer from loose
deﬁnitions, and as such can be a source of confusion; when correctly deﬁned, they do not
appear to be particularly insightful.
6 Stabilization vs. growth
We can now go back to the key question of the optimal ﬁscal policy under constraints,
and introduce more constraints. We have seen the role of the most obvious constraint, the
intertemporal government budget constraint. Now we introduce other constraints, which
for convenience can be grouped under the headings of credit constraints and political
constraints.
It is frequently asserted that ﬁscal policy tends to be procyclical in developing coun-
tries, thus failing to support the economy exactly when it is needed most; it is also
frequently asserted that "particularly in times of crises, too little attention is devoted
to the growth function of ﬁscal policy", a statement that sometimes translates into the
notion that "expenditure on public infrastructure and education is all too often sacriﬁced
in times of crises". In this section, I will consider the available evidence and possible
explanations. We will see that the explanations hinge mostly on credit and political
constraints.
6.1 The cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy: the facts
Several papers have studied the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy in OECD and developing
countries. Some of the more widely accepted conclusions are (see e.g. Kaminsky et al.
(2004) and Gavin and Perotti (1997)):
1) ﬁscal policy is typically procyclical in developing countries, namely the budget
deﬁcit is positively correlated with measures of economic activity like the output gap; in
contrast, a zero or negative correlation is typically found in OECD countries;
2) these patterns of correlation of the deﬁcit are due mostly to government spending,
although, because we do not have information on tax rates (except inﬂation) in developing
countries, it is not possible to assess soundly the cyclical properties of tax rates
3) the positive correlation of the output gap on one hand and the deﬁcit or spending
on the other is particularly pronounced during downturns;
4) both public investment and social spending (and particularly the more targeted
programs) fall as a percentage of GDP during downturns (see De Ferranti et al. (2000)).
19The cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy is typically estimated via a regression of the type
gt = αyt + βZt + εt
where g is government spending, y is output, and Z is a vector of other controls. When
this equation is estimated via OLS, as mentioned above α is typically found to be pos-
itive (a procyclical ﬁscal policy) in developing countries, and negative in industrialized
countries. As Rigobon (2004) argues, this might simply reﬂect the fact that developing
and industrialized countries are subject to diﬀerent shocks. The obvious solution is to use
instruments. The problem, as it is often the case, and as has been emphasized all along,
is that good instruments are hard to ﬁnd. Several studies (including most of those that
do ﬁnd a diﬀerence between industrialized and developing countries) use internal instru-
ments, like lagged variables, with all the usual problems. Galí and Perotti (2003), on a
sample of industrialized countries, use the GDP of trading partners; Rigobon (2004) uses
the terms of trade, and ﬁnds that the corresponding IV estimates of α do not vary system-
atically between industrialized and developing countries. He concludes that the ﬁnding of
ad i ﬀerent cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy in developing and industrialized countries is
just a consequence of the diﬀerent shocks to which they are subject. A similar argument
is made by Gopinath (2004). Clearly, this issue needs to be studied further.
6.2 Optimal ﬁscal policy over the business cycle
To study the optimal cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy, it is important to be clear about
the underlying assumptions. It is often the case that participants in the debate have
diﬀerent models and assumptions in mind, with diﬀerent implications, when they discuss
the issue.
Consider ﬁrst the benchmark case of a world that is subject to some shock to income.
Individuals and ﬁrms cannot insure: they can have at most access to a safe asset. Suppose
also initially that utility is quadratic, hence there is no scope for "precautionary savings".
Depending on the interactions between various types of ﬁnancial constraints and the
assumptions about the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy, one can obtain theories of optimal coun-
tercyclical but also of optimal procyclical ﬁscal policy.12 Beyond the technicalities, these
theories are essentially revisitations of the standard notions of the demand eﬀects and the
crowding out eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. If ﬁs c a lp o l i c ym a i n l yh a sd e m a n de ﬀects, and shifts
out the demand for goods, then clearly there is a role for a countercyclical ﬁscal policy
during recessions, when individuals or ﬁrms are credit constrained. If instead ﬁscal policy
12A note on the terminology: as emphasized by Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004), the notion of
counter- and pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy is subject to some ambiguity because budget outcomes are typically
expressed as shares of GDP. In times of high growth, the budget surplus as a share of GDP could fall
even if in absolute terms it increases. What is relevant for our purposes is the absolute amount, which
captures the contribution of ﬁscal policy to aggregate demand. .
20mainly has a negative wealth eﬀect on labor supply, and a crowding out eﬀect on private
investment, then there is a role for procyclical ﬁscal policy.
6.2.1 Optimal countercyclical ﬁscal policy
1) Suppose ﬁrst that all credit markets are perfect for all agents, i.e. that individuals,
ﬁrms and the government have access to the safe asset, hence they can do consumption
smoothing. If taxation is distortionary, and assuming a constant ﬂow of expenditure, a
countercyclical deﬁcit is an implication of Barro’s tax smoothing model. To minimize
lifetime distortions, the tax rates should be smoothed over time; this implies procyclical
tax revenues (with constant tax rates, revenues fall in a recession and increase in an
expansion), and countercyclical deﬁcits.
2) Now suppose that individuals are credit constrained, i.e. they do not have ac-
cess to a riskless asset, and as a consequence they cannot optimally smooth consumption.
It is then optimal for government spending to be countercyclical to help smooth individ-
ual consumption, either by reducing tax rates in a recession or by increasing government
spending (if the latter has a positive eﬀect on the disposable income of individuals, because
of demand eﬀects of ﬁscal policy).
3) Now suppose that ﬁrms are credit constrained, as in Aghion, Angeletos, Baner-
jee and Manova (2006). Then a similar argument to 2) suggests that ﬁscal policy should
be countercyclical. In a recession, ﬁrms’ proﬁts fall, and so does their capacity to borrow
if there are credit market imperfections (for instance, if the amount ﬁrms can borrow is
a function of current proﬁts). The ﬁrms’ ability to ﬁnance "innovative investment" also
falls, thus exacerbating the eﬀects of the negative shock. As a consequence, a counter-
cyclical ﬁscal policy has a positive eﬀect on productivity growth. It is then optimal for
the government to conduct a countercyclical ﬁscal policy, for instance by increasing gov-
ernment spending that shifts out the goods’ demand for these ﬁrms, or by subsidizing
"innovative investment" directly. Note that in the last two models, the optimal degree
of countercyclicality of ﬁscal policy is a positive function of the degree of imperfection of
the ﬁnancial system.
Note that these motivations for a countercyclical ﬁscal policy are conceptually very
diﬀerent from the "self-ﬁnanced growth" argument of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) or
Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2006). Empirically, and contrary to the prediction of
a standard neoclassical model with perfect credit markets subject to productivity shocks,
in developing countries there is a positive association between the current account and
growth. The explanation advanced by these papers is that, because of internal credit mar-
ket imperfections, a positive productivity shock causes private investment but especially
private savings to increase, and the current account to improve. But this does not imply
that ﬁscal policy should be countercyclical, i.e. that the government budget should be
positively associated with growth.
216.2.2 Optimal procyclical ﬁscal policy
However, there are also theories of optimal procyclicality of ﬁscal policy, also relying on
some form of imperfection in credit markets.
1) The ﬁrst one, by Caballero and Krishnamurty (1999) and Caballero and Krish-
namurty (2000), is based on the interaction between domestic and international
credit constraints.I naﬁnancial crisis, the supply of international credit becomes ver-
tical. Distressed ﬁrms have no direct access to international ﬁnancial markets, and must
rely on domestic investors. In a crisis, the ﬁnancing needs of distressed ﬁrms become
larger than their pledgeable resources, hence a ﬁre sale of domestic assets ensues. If ﬁrms
in distress cannot pledge their assets to domestic investors, there is less incentives for the
latter to accumulate international liquidity. This means more frequent ﬁre sales of assets,
and more severe recessions in case of drying up of international funds to a country. The
problem is that ﬁnancial markets do not reallocate resources well to the distressed sectors;
as a consequence, procyclical ﬁscal policy can be optimal: it is unlikely that government
spending is the optimal place to allocate the marginal dollar. The government should
reduce the deﬁcit to free up resources to allocate to distressed ﬁrms, particularly if the
government is no better placed than private investors to borrow abroad. This also implies
that the procyclical adjustment of ﬁscal policy should mainly be done on the spending
side, rather than on the tax side.
2) The crowding out eﬀect of government deﬁcit during a crisis is ampliﬁed by two more
factors. The decline in domestic private investment reduces the liquidity of the country’s
assets; second, the lack of ﬁscal discipline also prompts international investors to revise
their valuation of the country’s assets. For both reasons, the liquidity premium increases
further and the availability of external funding falls (Caballero and Krishnamurty (2004)).
The implication is that in developing countries the crowding out of private investment is
more severe during crises, for which they present some supporting evidence: it is thus
optimal for ﬁscal policy to be procyclical, and the more so during crises, and the less
developed ﬁnancial markets are. IMF (2003a) ﬁnds that, by several measures, some ﬁscal
expansion was appropriate in most of the countries that experienced a crisis, but was not
undertaken to avoid consequences on market conﬁdence.
3) Blanchard (2007) explores the interaction of current account deﬁcits, sudden stops,
ﬁscal policy and ﬁnancial imperfections. Suppose there is a current account deﬁcit, and a
positive probability that the country will be shut oﬀ from the world ﬁnancial markets. If
this happens, the real exchange rate must depreciate to close the current account deﬁcit.
But suppose that after a long period of low proﬁts, because of ﬁnancial imperfections the
tradable sector does not have the funds to expand:13 then there is a role for ﬁscal policy:
government spending on nontradables should fall in order to allow for an expansion of
the tradables sector; but also government spending on tradables should increase (with
13Caballero and Lorenzoni (2006) present a microfoundation of this mechanism.
22inﬁnitely elastic demand for tradables, a reduction in government spending on tradables
does not reduce the demand for tradables, but it reduces wealth and therefore increases
labor supply and the production of tradables). Overall, ﬁscal policy can be procyclical or
countercyclical, and may not reduce the current account deﬁcit initially.
The assumption on the ﬁnancial market imperfection is similar to that of Aghion et
al. (2006) above: because of low proﬁts, in a recession ﬁrms cannot ﬁnance investment.
Yet, the conclusions are nearly opposite: what changes is the assumption on ﬁscal policy:
here, it only has a wealth eﬀect; there it shifts the demand for the goods produced by
ﬁrms, and therefore their proﬁts.
6.3 Causes
What are the possible causes of the observed procyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy in de-
veloping countries?
1) The most obvious explanation is credit constraints at the level of the govern-
ment: when the government needs or wants to increase the budget deﬁcit, that’s precisely
when external credit is likely to dry up (in fact, Kaminsky et al.(2004) show that there is
a negative correlation between the budget balance and capital inﬂows).
2) Several politico-economic reasons have been put forward, from the "voracity ef-
fect" of Tornell and Lane (1998) to the "starve the Leviathan" argument of Alesina and
Tabellini (2005). The former is essentially a dynamic version of the common pool prob-
lem. In the latter, voters cannot observe precisely ﬁscal policy, in particular the liabilities
accumulated by the government. When the economy is booming, to prevent the govern-
ment from appropriating tax revenues, voters demand more public goods for themselves,
imparting a procyclical bias to ﬁscal policy. The implication is that the procyclicality
of ﬁscal policy should be stronger in more corrupt democracies, a result for which the
authors ﬁnd some empirical support.
3) The "hidden deﬁcit" argument of Burnside et al (2001): although the oﬃcial gov-
ernment accounts do not present particularly high deﬁcits, the accumulation of contingent
liabilities induces a cut in the deﬁcit during sudden stops to make room for the costs of
the bailout of the ﬁnancial system, and other contingent liabilities associated with sudden
stops.
7 Self-insurance vs. hedging
In a recession, the present discounted value of government revenues falls and that of
spending increases: hence, a ﬁscal policy that was regarded as sustainable before the
recession might not be sustainable afterwards: measures must be taken to restore sustain-
ability. The problem is compounded if the government and/or the country face credit
23constraints, and if the market is myopic, so that it looks at the ﬂows rather than the
whole intertemporal government budget constraint.
For all these reasons, something must be done. Critics of the recent ﬁscal performance
of many developing countries, and of the advice of international organizations in the
aftermaths of the ﬁnancial crises of the late nineties, argue that the ﬁscal policy that was
implemented actually reduced the country’s net worth, by cutting productive government
spending and thus future growth and revenues. Instead of supporting this strategy,
international organizations should have gone against the market, by shifting the focus
from the short run to the long run.
But the alternative is self-insurance. Suppose that utility is not quadratic, so that
there is scope for precautionary savings. If it is optimal to conduct a countercyclical
ﬁscal policy, and if the reason is the credit constraints on the government during down-
turns, then the obvious question is: why don’t governments self-insure? Even if it cannot
borrow, a government can always accumulate assets in an upturn, to be decumulated in
a countercyclical fashion in a downturn.14
One view is that self-insurance is macroeconomically irrelevant: "It makes no sense for
these economies to have to self-insure through large reserve accumulation or stabilization
funds. Most individuals would be "underinsured" if they had to leave a million dollars
aside for a potential car collision and the liabilities that would follow, rather than buying
insurance against such event — countries are no diﬀerent" (Caballero (2002)). According
to this view, the only macroeconomically viable option is to acquire insurance, rather
than self-insurance.15
However, this argument applies to catastrophic events, such as sudden stops: it is
indeed extremely costly to self-insure against such relatively rare and large events. But
the procyclicality of ﬁscal policy in developing countries is not due just to these episodes
(see Kaminsky et al. (2004)); hence, self-insurance should be regarded just as a form
of precautionary savings against "normal" shocks. The real questions are how much
self-insurance one should have, and how to create an institutional set-up that is more
conducive to such a self-insurance.
On the ﬁrst question, the collection of essays in Engel and Meller (1993) presents some
results, while Engel and Valdés (2000) discuss sub-optimal but implementable rules for
self-insurance under various assumptions. Although these are important contributions,
in particular because of their focus on implementable rules, more work is certainly needed
on these issues. The second question introduces us to ﬁscal rules and stabilization funds.
14In recent years, several countries (some of which previously hit by the ﬁnancial crsies of the nineties)
have accumulated large foreign reserves, by historical standards. Exactly why they have done so, however,
and what is the role of the government budget, is not entirely clear.
15The ﬁnancial instruments for such an insurance are not available yet, and a discussion of how such
a market could be created would take us too far (see e.g. Caballero (2002) and Draghi, Giavazzi, and
Merton (2003)).
248 Stabilization funds and ﬁscal rules
These have typically a double role: to ensure discipline in ﬁscal policy, hence to ensure
sustainability of public ﬁnances; and to avoid a procyclical bias in ﬁscal policy in the pres-
ence of credit constraints. Although these two objectives are perceived to be antithetical
(ﬁscal rules are typically accused of generating more, not less procyclicality), in reality if
properly understood they are complementary.
8.1 Stabilization funds
Stabilization funds are assets accumulation accounts that use speciﬁc proceeds to stabilize
government spending over time. As Engel and Valdés (2000) emphasize, a stabilization
fund is just part of the optimal design of ﬁscal policy: if the rest of ﬁscal policy undoes
what the stabilization fund has achieved, there is not beneﬁt from the latter. An example
highlights the intuition: if expenditure out of oil wealth is stabilized completely, but the
rest of the budget continues to set expenditure correlated with oil prices, then there is no
beneﬁt from a stabilization fund.
Thus, the diﬀerence between a stabilization fund and a well designed ﬁscal rule is
purely notional. In fact, the cyclically adjusted ﬁscal rule of Chile, where the adjustment
is with respect to the price of copper as well, can be interpreted as incorporating the notion
of a stabilization fund. Indeed, the clear advantage of a uniﬁed rule is precisely that the
government cannot undo a self-insurance policy without violating some self-imposed rule.
Independent stabilization funds might have an advantage in terms of transparency and
political visibility; however, it is important that divestiture rules be set clearly, to prevent
the government spending the accumulated assets at will.
8.2 Numerical rules on the deﬁcit
Numerical ﬁscal rules are a common feature in many industrialized and developing coun-
tries. I will focus on two types of rules: numerical rules on ﬁscal aggregates, mainly the
budget deﬁcit or debt, and rules concerning the composition of the budget, in particular
the Golden Rule.
Numerical rules on budget aggregates are a typical example of the trade-oﬀ between
rules and discretion. As mentioned above, their obvious goal is to enhance the sustain-
ability of ﬁscal policy. But they are frequently criticized, on several grounds:
(i) a limit on the budget deﬁcit induces a procyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy in times
of negative shocks
(ii) it can also jeopardize public investment, because typically the latter is politically
the easiest item to cut in the short run;
(iii) a numerical rule induces budget gimmickry in order to circumvent them de facto.
In particular
25(iii.a) it invites budget gimmicky to reclassify expenditure items so that they are no
longer subject to the rule; it is also unlikely to cover quasi-ﬁscal operations, that in many
countries are the main source of ﬁscal problems in times of crisis;
(iii.b) it can be satisﬁed by measures that do not alter the present discounted value
of spending and revenues, but simply reallocates them over time (see Easterly (1999) and
Milesi-Ferretti (2003));
All these facts are well understood; but they miss two key points, namely:
1) Fiscal rules are second-best options that are typically used in situations where
institutional and political problems cause ﬁscal policy to be extremely volatile and erratic.
From this perspective, quite simply ﬁscal rules can be instrumental in preventing crises
and in preserving market access. As instruments of self-insurance, they help enhance the
creditworthiness of the country, and automatically facilitate the return to countercyclical
capital ﬂows to the country as a whole, which in itself is a stabilizing factor. Thus, it
is true that, conditional on a crisis occurring,an u m e r i c a lﬁscal rule on the budget
might induce a procyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy; but over longer periods they can
also reduce the probability of a crisis occurring.
2) In addition, a rule based on the cyclically adjusted deﬁcit is compatible with any
degree of countercyclicality of ﬁscal policy: the actual degree of countercyclicality depends
on the extent to which automatic stabilizers are built in the government budget. At
present, in most developing countries there are virtually no automatic stabilizers on the
spending side. But if the share of automatic stabilizers were to increase, so would the
stabilizing role of ﬁscal policy, even with a ﬁscal rule (if based on the cyclically adjusted
deﬁcit).
The key issue with cyclically adjusted budget rules is that the cyclical adjustment itself
is bound to be a controversial issue, for three reasons. To construct the output gap, one
needs an estimate in real time of the current economic conditions, and of potential output:
both are controversial; and the estimate of the various tax and spending elasticities are also
riddled with uncertainty. Blanchard (1993) proposes instead estimating what the budget
balance would be if the current policies were applied at the economic conditions prevailing
in the previous period. This removes two sources of controversy: it does not require an
estimate of potential output, and it uses information on GDP and unemployment in the
previous period, rather than the current one.16
16T h ec a s eo ft h eC h i l e a nﬁscal rule studied below indicates that these problems are not forbidding
in practice. One advantage of the Chilean ﬁscal rule, however, is that much of the cyclical adjustment
depends on the price of copper, which is available in real time. Th eling run price, however, must still be
estimated: as we will see, this is done by asking a group of experts.
However, in one respect the focus on the budget deﬁcit might appear misguided. If one goal of the
rule is to enhance the creditworthiness of the country, it should probably be formulated as a target on
government debt rather than the deﬁcit: presumably, international capital markets look at the stock of
debt outstanding rather than the ﬂow. However, conceptually what matters is the net liabilities of the
government; but the asset side of the net liability position is always diﬃcult to measure and somewhat
26Numerical limits on the deﬁcits, in various forms, have been in force in most US states
for several decades; recently, they were adopted by the US in 1990 (the Gramm-Rudman-
Holling Act), Canada in 1991, New Zealand in 1994, by several Latin American countries
in the nineties (various forms of Fiscal Responsibility Acts), and of course by several
European countries via the Maastricht Treaty and then the Growth and Stability Pact.
Econometric investigations display mild evidence that these rules have some eﬀects on the
budget outcomes, both at the level of US states (Alt and Lowry (1994), Bohn and Inman
(1996)) and in Latin American countries (Alesina et al. (1999)). However, this type of
investigations run against some key diﬃculties: ﬁrst, it is hard to collapse the diﬀerent
provisions of these rules into one or more numerical indicators; almost certainly these
rules are endogenous (one can argue that countries resort to them when they perceive a
problem, and presumably a consensus has been formed to do something); and, in the case
o fE u r o p ew h e r ear u l eh a sb e e nf o r c e do nan u m b e ro fc o u n t r i e sa tt h es a m et i m e ,i t
is diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀects of the rules from other trends occurring at the same
time. To take just one example, although Alesina et al. (1999) ﬁnd that on average the
Fiscal responsibility Acts of the nineties in Latin America have been successful in reducing
the deﬁcit, there is a wide perception in the last few years that in most cases they were
largely ineﬀectual, and in fact in several instances were abandoned at the ﬁrst important
negative shock (see e.g. Perry (2003)).
Regarding the eﬀects of rules on the cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy, Galí and Perotti
(2003) ﬁnd no evidence that ﬁscal policy in European countries in the post-Maastricht
years became more procyclical than in the pre-Maastricht years. Sorenesen et al (2001)
ﬁnd that US states with more stringent budget rules have more pro-cyclical ﬁscal polices,
while Alesina and Bayoumi (1996) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect.
8.3 The Golden Rule
Consider now rules on the composition of the budget. The most famous of such rules,
the Golden Rule, essentially states that, while current government spending must be
covered by revenues, capital spending can be ﬁnanced with debt. The rationale for this
rule is that the social return of public investment is such that "it pays for itself", i.e. if
the intertemporal government budget constraint was satisﬁed before the investment, it
will be satisﬁed even after the investment at the existing tax rates. This is obviously an
empirical issue, and the analysis above on the estimate of the social rates of return to
public investment makes it very doubtful that this condition is satisﬁed in practice. Of
course, this does not mean that public investment should not be carried out: if the social
rate of return is higher than the social user cost of capital, than a given public investment
arbitrary (what types of assets should be counted?). In addition, as we have argued for various reasons
international capital markets might loook at ﬂows even more than stocks. For these reasons, focusing on
the deﬁcit is not only more practical but also appropriate.
27project should well be carried out even if the ﬁnancial return to the government is zero.
And it does not even mean that the Golden Rule should not apply: it might well have a
political or communication signiﬁcance. But it does mean that this speciﬁc rationale for
the Golden Rule does not appear to be supported by the data.17
The Golden Rule has an additional, important shortcoming that is particularly severe
in developing countries: it creates strong incentives for creative accounting, to reclassify
al sort of current spending items as government investment, in order to allow for a larger
deﬁcit: this can be seen very clearly in the case of Colombia, studied by Ayala and Perotti
(2005).
8.4 A ﬁscal rule in practice: the case of Chile18
I ti so f t e na r g u e dt h a tﬁscal rules are however diﬃcult or impossible to implement because
of technical diﬃculties. I will discuss this issue in the case of Chile, which has probably
the most successful and long-lasting ﬁscal rule among developing countries.
Since 2001, Chile has adopted a rule that constrains the cyclically adjusted budget
surplus to be no less than 1 percent of GDP. It is important to note that this rule was
conceived in the late nineties precisely as a measure to break the procyclical behavior
of ﬁscal policy. When the rule was introduced, the common expectation was of buoyant
copper prices and an expanding economy: the rule was designed as a means of constraining
t h ep r e s s u r et os p e n dt h eh i g he x p e c t e dr e v e n u e s .
The rule has held up quite well so far: in the 4 year period 2001-2004, the average
cyclically adjusted surplus has been about .8 percent of GDP. It has also withstood con-
siderable political pressure. In July of 2003 the “long-term price” of copper for 2004
(which is used to compute cyclically adjusted government revenues, and hence the maxi-
mum government spending) was set at 88. But by the end of 2003, while the budget was
being discussed, the price of copper increased to 120. However, despite political pressure
to raise the long term estimate, the Finance Ministry resisted, and government spending
was set on the basis of a price for 2004 of 88.
Thus, operationally the rule has held up surprisingly well so far. In fact, it seems to
enjoy widespread popularity among academics, government oﬃcials, and public sector
oﬃcials of diﬀerent political hues. It also illustrates that some widespread criticisms
17T h e r ei s a ni s s u ea st ow h a td e ﬁnition of investment shoud be debt ﬁnanced. A rule allowing
debt ﬁnancing of gross investment ("gross investment Golden Rule") could be a way to protect public
investment, but asymptotically implies a level of the public debt above the public capital stock. A rule
allowing debt ﬁnancing of net investment only ("net investment Golden Rule") implies an asymptotic
level of public debt that is equal to the public capital stock (if inﬂation is 0 - see Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2005)).
18This section is based in part on Giavazzi and Perotti (2005). See also Fiess (2002) for a description
of the Chilean ﬁscal rule.
28of ﬁscal rules can be handled quite eﬀectively in practice - of course given the right
institutional environment. I now consider two such criticisms.
1) T h er u l ei se a s yt om a n i p u l a t e .
The forecasts of copper prices and of the output gap are produced by two groups,
w h i c hi n2 0 0 4w e r ec o m p o s e do f1 2a n d1 4e x p e r t sr e s p e c t i v e l y . O n ec o u l da r g u et h a t
some of these agents might have an incentive to provide biased forecasts. However, this
criticism of limited practical relevance. The outliers are always discarded; and reputa-
tional mechanisms are likely to play a key role. In any case, if anything the evidence so
far suggest that these experts tend to underpredict copper prices. Thus, while between
2001 and 2003 actual copper prices increased by about 70 percent, the long-term forecast
of the panel of experts actually fell, if only slightly.
2) The rule is not transparent, and therefore it is not easy to communicate.
This criticism has two distinct components: the notion of cyclically adjusted revenues
and spending is hard to communicate to the media and the politicians; and the construc-
tion of the output gap and the long run copper price is convoluted. Consequently, the rule
is perceived as arcane. However, from several conversations with politicians, academics
and government oﬃcials in Chile, exactly the opposite position seems to emerge, that a
cyclically adjusted rule is an easy and eﬀective benchmark to communicate to politicians.
In any case, the alternative — to base the rule on the actual deﬁcit — would plunge Chile
back into the problems caused by a pro-cyclical ﬁscal policy–the main cause underlying
the extreme volatility of output growth throughout the rest of Latin America. Chilean
policymakers seem to be well aware of this issue. Clearly the correct approach is highly
dependent on the characterization of the stochastic process of the copper price — a highly
controversial issue. This, in the end the current approach might be just right: an alterna-
tive that puts more weight on the recent copper prices to predict the future would, among
other things, imply much more variability of ﬁscal policy.
8.5 The political economy of self-insurance
So sound ﬁscal rules on the cyclically adjusted deﬁcit seem to be feasible after all. Why
then do we observe so little self-insurance? As we have seen, for some self-insurance is too
costly. But procyclical ﬁscal policy is costly too.
It is likely that the true reason has to do with the realm of political economy. Quite
simply, in good times it is politically impossible to put aside tax revenues and withstand
the accusation of neglecting needy sectors like health, education and infrastructure. pol-
icymakers and politicians are often quite aware of the need for self-insurance, but ﬁnd
it politically self-defeating. Existing politico-economic explanations of the procyclicality
of ﬁscal policy in developing countries do not capture this simple but probably crucial
aspect. Sustainability Councils have been proposed precisely to overcome some of these
political problems.
298.6 Alternative solutions: a Sustainability Council
In principle, a Sustainability Council such as proposed e.g. by Charles Wyplosz and
Jurgen von Hagen could solve all the problems outlined above with ﬁscal rules:
(i) it could make a better assessment of sustainability than by relying on current deﬁcit
only
(ii) it could assess the impact of productive spending
(iii) it could assess the cyclical position of the government.
However, as we have seen these are highly contentious issues, on which even well
trained economists disagree strongly. Note that the academic or other qualiﬁcations of
the Council are not the issue here. The case of Ireland in2001 and its treatment by the
European Council of Ministers might provide a useful analogy. Ireland’s 2001 stability
programme included a fall in income and indirect taxes as a share of GDP by about .6 pp
in 2001 and another .6 pp in 2002; and an increase in public investment by .2 and .6 pp
of GDP in 2001 and 2002, respectively. It also envisaged a fall in the cyclically adjusted
surplus by .3 percentage points in 2001, and stable in 2002. At the time Ireland had
a budget surplus, the highest rate of growth in the world (after China) for the previous
120 years, and a low inﬂation rate. Yet, the European Council of Ministers (in charge of
evaluating the program) issued the strongest form of censure on this ﬁscal program (the
only time it ever used it) on the ground that “.. the Council considers that the stimulatory
nature of the budget for 2001 poses a considerable risk to the benign outlook in terms
of growth and inﬂation....[... ] the strategy of inducing labor force increases though an
alleviation of the direct tax burden, which was recommended in the 2000 broad economic
policy guidelines (BEPG)... may have become less eﬀective than in the past, because it
took place in the context of an expansionary budgetary policy... Further, while indirect
taxes cuts have a once-and-for-all eﬀect on the price level, they probably have no lasting
eﬀect on the rate of inﬂation but clearly further stimulate demand” (Oﬃcial Journal C
077, 9.3.2001, p.7).
Thus, the passage makes the following points:
(i) higher demand causes higher inﬂation;
(ii) indirect tax cuts cause higher demand;
(iii) indirect tax cuts causes reductions in inﬂation, but only in the short run.
Clearly (iii) is inconsistent with (i) and (ii); also, no empirical evidence on these points
(or their opposites).
In the same passage the Council makes several other important factual points on the
empirics of ﬁscal policy. It asserts that:
(i) a reduction in the cyclically adjusted budget surplus by .3 percentage points of
GDP has a measurable positive impact on inﬂation;
(ii) on the other hand, an increase in government investment has a negative impact in
inﬂation;
(iii) a reduction in income taxes has a negative eﬀect on inﬂation....
30(iv) .... but only if it does not take place in “the context of an expansionary budgetary
policy”.
Note (iv) is a rather exotic statement on cross-derivative of inﬂation to taxes and
change in budget deﬁcit.
This example demonstrates that, based on our current state of knowledge, a perfectly
respectable body can make any statement on ﬁscal policy. A Sustainability Council
will necessarily be a political appointment. There will be plenty of people among likely
political appointees that will be willing — in perfectly good faith - to make this kind of
statements.
What would happen if the debt Board and the government disagreed on the projections
a n do nt h ea s s u m e de ﬀects of ﬁscal policy? Perhaps the Debt Board could make diﬀerent,
more realistic assumptions on the endogenous variables, like the future rate of growth of
the economy. But could it make diﬀerent assumptions on the ﬁscal policy instruments,
say, the increase in the retirement age? This would require a much higher degree of
political involvement than acceptable to all parts.
But let’s assume away all these problems. The key to the credibility of a Sustainability
Council is that whatever powers society delegates to them, they must be permanent: if
delegation withdrawn at ﬁrst diﬃculty, credibility of the Council is destroyed.
Fiscal policy is fundamentally diﬀerent from monetary policy: much stronger distrib-
utional impact. Even if agreed on a public ﬁnance assessment for the short and medium
run, the same goal could be achieved with a continuum of measures with enormously dif-
ferent distributional impacts: no government will credibly delegate these powers forever
to an independent, unelected body.
Perhaps after many years the Sustainability Council might show a better track record
at forecasting: but the notion of the standard error of forecasts is usually not part of the
political discourse — for a reason. And if the political survival of the government is at
stake, the winner cannot be the Sustainability Council.
Ultimately, its role can only be to make more visible, hence politically costly, a fragrant
departure from realism and plausibility. This would be akin to Congressional Budget
Oﬃce in the US. But in addition, Sustainability Council would also have the power to
issue informal warnings, a kind of whistle-blower of ﬁscal policy. Any power beyond this
is unrealistic, and in any case unlikely to survive the ﬁrst political skirmish.
9 Distributional aspects
There is a huge literature on the distributional aspects of ﬁscal policy, mostly focusing
on health spending, social insurance (pensions) and social assistance, and some subsidies,
which with good enough data can be imputed directly to income classes. A large part
of this research concerns Latin America, where the stylized facts are (see the excellent
contribution of Lindert, Skouﬁas and Shapiro (2006) based on household surveys):
31(i) health and social insurance programs, including pensions, are not progressive, partly
b e c a u s et h e yc o n c e r nm o s t l yt h ef o r m a ls e c t o r
(ii) social assistance programs tend to be more progressive, but are usually much
smaller than social insurance; in addition, only the Conditional Cash transfer programs
introduced recently in many Latin American countries seem really progressive. Many
other social assistance programs are extremely fragmented (see e.g. Perotti (2005)) and
are extremely diﬃcult even to track down, let alone to evaluate.
(iii) many subsidies, like fuel subsidies, are very badly targeted (see Coady et al.
(2006))
(iv) spending on education beyond the primary level is often regressive, particularly
spending on tertiary education that is often free but attended mostly by the upper quin-
tiles.
A growing literature also studies the distributional eﬀects of the large crises of the
1990s. Because of its excellent data and its large crisis, Indonesia has been extensively
studied; Halac and Schmukler (2003) also ﬁnd large regressive transfers associated with
the failure of ﬁnancial institutions.
Because these facts are fairly uncontroversial, and because the literature on the subject
is very large, I will not dwell further on it here; in the next section I will illustrate some
issues that in my opinion are still open, or worthwhile insisting on.
10 Open questions
10.1 Estimating the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy
10.1.1 The short run
The key issue here is to increase the standards of the empirical analysis. Some background
papers for certain World Bank studies do not seem to meet the minimal requirements.
Not in all cases the available data will be enough to make a proper empirical analysis; and
even when the data are available, some methodologies are simply not acceptable, largely
because they make unabashedly causal statements from analyses that do not even begin
to address the issue of causality, i.e. of a proper identiﬁcation.
When data are available (presumably in few countries) it would be useful to try and
estimate the short-run eﬀects of ﬁscal policy from local data on ﬁrms, employment and
government spending. This has long been in the mind of many economists, although to
my knowledge very little has been done along these lines even for countries with excellent
data, like the US or Canada. The reason, I suspect, is partly because it is not clear what
methodology one should use: a lot of thinking will have to be put into this.
3210.1.2 The long run
At the theoretical level, there are plenty of papers detailing all possible mechanisms
through which public infrastructure can aﬀect welfare. The list of possible channels is
nearly inﬁnite, and it does not seem productive to think of yet more channels. The key
issue is empirical.
Whatever one thinks of cross-sectional or panel regressions, it is likely that this ap-
proach has said most of what it had to say on the rates of return to infrastructure. Even
accepting the prevailing wisdom that it typically shows high rates of returns to infrastruc-
ture, it is hard to see what else it can do besides creating a cultural climate favorable to
infrastructure investment. But such climate already exists, at least in words: the issue is
how to budget resources for infrastructure, and especially for which infrastructure. On
this, cross- sectional regressions have little to say.
The recent World Bank eﬀort of evaluating Public Investment in a number of Pilot
Countries (see World Bank (2005)) provides a timid attempt at estimating the relation
between public investment and growth in time series in each individual country, in the
form of a correlation between public investment and growth. Clearly, such an approach
is a non-starter: one cannot hope to provide meaningful policy advice with such crude
simple time series correlations.
The same report points out that there are at the moment two approaches to quan-
tify the need for public investment in these countries: the "catching up" approach of
Calderon and Serven (2004), based on the distance from the "regional leader" in terms of
infrastructure; and the implied demand for infrastructure, from projected GDP growth,
from Fay and Yepes (2003). While informative, both approaches are not based on any
social marginal return calculation.
The key issue, not surprisingly, is a cost-beneﬁt analysis of individual projects or
sectors in individual countries. But very few countries have in place the manpower to
do solid project appraisal: possibly only Chile, which perhaps not coincidentally has the
strongest reputation for soundness of its public investment. The report also notes that
in all these countries inadequate importance is given to maintenance and rehabilitation
spending.
These two areas - project appraisal and maintenance - seem key in terms of research. Of
course, these two issues are not unknown to international organizations. But particularly
on the second one little systematic research seems to exist. It would be useful to document
more extensively how little resources are devoted to maintenance (see Eustache (2004))
and cases of wasteful duplications of investment when proper maintenance would have
achieved the same at a fraction of the cost.
Clearly, political factors play an important role in the neglect of maintenance: it is
much more visible, and politically rewarding, to construct a new highway rather than
repairing an existing one. Here too it would be useful to document systematically the
importance of these political factors and of corruption.
33The distributional aspect of public infrastructure is also a relatively neglected issue:
as Estache (2004) agues, there is very little research on this issue, mostly by just a few
researchers - P. Lanjouw, Ravallion, Van de Valle, and Wodon. And there is even less
research on the eﬀects of corruption on public investment and its eﬃciency. These are two
more issues that seem of fundamental importance in assessing the desirability of public
investment in developing countries, and on which again cross-sectional regressions do not
have much to say.
10.2 Cyclical issues and self-insurance
Although there tends to be a consensus that ﬁscal policy in developing countries is prob-
ably less countercyclical than it should be, as we have seen the optimal cyclical behavior
of ﬁscal policy depends on a number of features, that only now begin to be discussed.
A systematic discussion of these features is however still missing; in particular, we do
not have a sense of which are more important and where, and what are the implications
for the optimal management of individual types of government spending. Here, for once
theoretical research seems useful. An example is a clariﬁcation of the issue I discussed
brieﬂy in section 6: depending on the nature of the ﬁnancial imperfection, but especially
of the assumed eﬀect of ﬁscal policy (wealth vs. demand eﬀects), one can reach opposite
conclusions about the optimal cyclical behavior of ﬁscal policy in a ﬁnancial crisis. This
issue is not well understood, and needs clariﬁcation both at a theoretical and empirical
level.
Another important issue is what frequency of procyclicality is relevant. Hnatovska
and Loayza (2005) argue that the "crisis component of volatility", rather than the overall
volatility, is what is really damaging growth in developing countries. It might be that
something similar is true for the observed procyclicality of ﬁscal policy: perhaps it does
not matter much, except in times of substantial crisis.
The value of and scope for self-insurance are also substantially diﬀerent depending
on the structure of the economy: for instance, self-insurance is conceptually relatively
straightforward and relatively easy to implement (except for political constraints) in
oil producing and commodity exporting countries. Its implementation and motivation is
diﬀerent in other countries that are trying to enhance their creditworthiness. It would be
important to construct a taxonomy of countries in this dimension that could be used for
policy purposes.
10.3 Solvency and sustainability
There is not much to say on this issue. The technicalities of solvency theory and tests
can become overwhelming, but their practical implications are limited. The sustainability
analysis performed by the World Bank and IMF seems sound, and appears much more
34useful than the standard solvency tests.
Debt stabilizing primary surpluses are useful communication devices. Perhaps they
could be improved in the direction suggested by Tanner (2003): use historical probability
distributions on a umber of macro variables to assess the probability that a certain
primary surplus stabilizes the debt ratio.
As stressed by IMF (2003), however, they are useful only in as much as they are based
on data that cover the whole general government (including the social security funds), and
possibly the whole public sector; and only if they are based on a sound evaluation of the
underlying contingent liabilities. The impact of the real exchange rate on sustainability
and debt dynamics is also an important issue, as the experience of Brazil during East
Asian crisis has shown. All these issues are clearly well appreciated by international
organizations, so there is not much to say besides the opportunity to insist on these data
issues more than on solvency tests with no practical impact.
10.4 Rules
T h ek e yi s s u eh e r ei sw h yw eo b s e r v es ol i t t l es e l f - i n s u r a n c ei nm o s tc o u n t r i e st h a th a v e
intermittent access to ﬁnancial markets. An obvious explanation is political; but then
it would be useful to study easy, implementable and transparent rules that have good
economic properties and are politically feasible.
There is instead little point in trying harder to estimate the eﬀects of ﬁscal rules from
cross section or panel regressions. Issues of endogeneity appear to be overwhelming, and
diﬃcult to overcome convincingly; also, because of the little exogenous time variation at
high frequency, it is diﬃcult to distinguish the eﬀects of rules form concurrent trends in
ﬁscal policy and other variables.
Despite this, there is no question that a well designed rule could help a country that is
trying to establish a minimum of ﬁscal credibility. To this end, a ﬁrst requirement seems
to be that the rule must be designed to withstand at the ﬁrst sign of ﬁscal stress; in this
sense, a rule on the cyclically adjusted deﬁcit like that of Chile seems a must, despite the
well known technical diﬃculties in cyclically adjusting the budget. Despite its popularity
in many academic and policy circles, the Golden Rule is not a good idea, especially in
developing countries: it invites budget gimmicks, and has little economic rationale.
10.5 Distributional issues
International organizations, and particularly the World Bank and the Inter American
Development Bank, have a very large number of publications studying the distributional
impact of government spending. Yet, it is not obvious that the main message has trick-
led out to the policy debate: namely, how little targeted and progressive many of these
spending items are. Here, the problem seems more one of communication than research.
35Perhaps one problem of the existing research is that its methodology is not well estab-
lished, and that CGE models (on which these results are often based) are not very popular
outside the international organizations; it might be useful to set up a dedicated program
of study to take advantage of the frontier microeconometric techniques to assess the dis-
tributional impact of ﬁscal policy from non-experimental data.
Perhaps the fragmentation and dispersion of social assistance programs in many devel-
oping countries is not always adequately appreciated (see e.g. Perotti (2005) on Colom-
bia). Here, it would be useful to document systematically the sometimes overwhelming
fragmentation of the welfare state in these countries.
Finally, there seems to be no question that in terms of researchable issues and richness
of data the most promising area of research is the investigation of the several experimental
cash transfer programs set up in various Latin American countries.
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